




Social Governance After Lisbon: The Ambiguities of Policy Co-ordination  
Kenneth Armstrong
*
Queen Mary, University of London 
 
Paper to be presented to the European Union Studies Association Biennial 
Conference, Montreal, Canada, 17
th-19
th May 2007. 
 
This is a draft paper for a Symposium to be published in the Journal of Common 
Market Studies on ‘Governance After Lisbon’ in early 2008. Not for quotation without 
author’s consent. Comments welcome to k.a.armstrong@qmul.ac.uk. 
 
                                                 
* Professor of European Union Law, School of Law, Queen Mary, University of London: 
http://www.law.qmul.ac.uk/ Abstract 
The paper contends that the Lisbon strategy for a reformed economic, social and 
environmental governance is bedevilled by ambiguities operating at different levels. First, it 
has been unclear to what extent issues of social governance remain central to the Lisbon 
goals. Second, even if Lisbon has a social dimension, there are competing organising 
frameworks which may argue for a greater or lesser independent identity to that social 
dimension. Third, the use of the open method of co-ordination has avoided a deeper 
specification of the need for EU intervention in social policy: indeed, there has generally been 
a failure to distinguish between competing rationales for policy co-ordination not all of which 
may survive the application of a subsidiarity test. Fourth, attempts to streamline and reform 
the social OMC processes have not resolved these ambiguities and indeed have further 
highlighted a tension between a desire to focus on key social messages to drive co-ordination 
and a governance architecture which supports a much more open, selective and elective 
process of (potential) policy learning across states. Fifthly, the recent consultation on ‘active 
inclusion’ will be an important test for the future social co-ordination architecture, involving 
choices between quite different interpretations of the role of co-ordination in EU social 
governance. Finally, the paper suggests that one means of resolving the ambiguities of OMC 
is to place much less emphasis upon OMC as a means of ‘governing’ social inclusion and 
instead to focus on structures through which information gathering and monitoring might be 
harnessed to a rather older normative preoccupation, namely, the ‘accountability’ of 
governments. 
  
  2Introduction 
 
Drawing on research on the European Union’s attempt to co-ordinate Member States’ 
strategies and policies to tackle poverty and social exclusion through the use of the 
‘open method of co-ordination’, the paper argues that debilitating ambiguities pervade 
both the policy context in which co-ordination is being undertaken – the Lisbon 
Strategy for the reform of economic, social and environmental governance –  and the 
technique of policy co-ordination itself. Much of the literature on OMC – in seeking 
to evaluate and compare its effectiveness as a means of ‘Europeanizing’ domestic 
policy – has paid insufficient attention to these ambiguities. It will be argued that 
potentially quite radical changes are needed to the governance architecture of Lisbon 
if its social dimension is to resolve these ambiguities and if co-ordination is to stand 
any chance of producing meaningful results. 
  
Social Governance: Inside or Outside Lisbon? 
As Borrás and Jacobbsen (2004) have highlighted, the strategy of economic and social 
reform announced at the Lisbon European Council in 2000 had a ‘Janus’ quality in 
seeking to combine the goals of ‘competitiveness’ and ‘social cohesion’. However, 
the extent to which issues of social governance ought to be considered as either inside 
or out of the Lisbon processes is open to conflicting interpretation and to different 
interpretations over time. As Daly (2006) has suggested, there has always been an 
ambivalence in the relationship between economic and social policy in the EU: on the 
one hand, economic progress can be considered to be the driving force of social 
progress, but on the other hand, social policy may be required to be pursued as a 
distinctive policy strand either to manage the consequences of economic change or 
indeed to help support that process of change. This ambivalence has been reflected in 
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2005 following the mid-term review of the strategy (European Commission, 2005a). 
  Certainly, the Lisbon Conclusions contained a commitment on the part of the 
EU and the Member States to pursue social cohesion, tackle social exclusion and, in 
particular, to make a ‘decisive impact on poverty’. Viewed in this way, social 
commitments were part of the Lisbon agenda as an independent and supporting 
element of the reform process and something to be pursued alongside the economic 
agenda as part of a balanced package: the ‘policy triangle’ of economic, employment 
and social policy measures. From 2000 onwards, the rhetoric – the references to social 
policy as a ‘productive factor’ in the 2000-5 Social Agenda (European Commission 
2005b)– and the subsequent action – the development of the so-called ‘open method 
of co-ordination’ – pointed in the direction of social policy as an independent but 
supporting part of Lisbon, with the Nice European Council (responsible for launching 
the social inclusion OMC) referring to economic growth and social cohesion as 
‘mutually reinforcing’. Moreover, new co-ordination processes on pensions and 
healthcare were launched as part of the modernization of social protection systems 
agenda. In this way, new life was given to EU social policy and EU social governance 
as a consequence of its distinctive but complementary role within the Lisbon process. 
  Nonetheless, the relaunch of the Lisbon process in 2005 following the 
European Commission’s mid-term review indicated, at least initially, that the second 
interpretation was to be the driving force of Lisbon. The preceding report of the High-
Level Group (2004) chaired by Wim Kok  included not one social priority in its five 
priority areas for action, while the Commission’s own Communication (2005a) to 
relaunch the Lisbon process paid scant attention to the social dimension. The 
emphasis appeared to shift from social policy as a productive factor to social policy as 
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the ‘rising tide raises all boats’ philosophy of the Kok report. In this way, Lisbon II 
appeared to push both social commitments and social processes out of the Lisbon 
agenda.  
Notwithstanding the general sense that the mid-term review of Lisbon – 
coinciding with the entry into office of the new Barosso Commission –  signalled a 
retreat from the idea of social policy as a ‘productive factor’, the response to Lisbon II 
from social and political actors might be considered to have actually helped maintain 
the post-Lisbon momentum of EU social policy. NGOs not surprisingly mobilised in 
campaigns to keep the EU to the social commitments that had apparently been made 
at Lisbon in 2000 and to maintain and strengthen the OMC processes (Lisbon II also 
coincided with the mid-term review of the social inclusion OMC process and its 
‘streamlining’ with the newly launched pensions and healthcare processes, discussed 
further below). On the political side, the Social Protection Committee – the 
Committee composed of national civil servants that serves as a political clearing 
house for the social OMC processes – responded to the Kok report by reiterating the 
need for ‘mutually supportive interaction’ between the economic and social elements 
of Lisbon (SPC, 2004). The subsequent meeting of the Employment, Social Policy, 
Health and Consumer Affairs Council (Council of the EU, 2004) reaffirmed the 
original objectives of the Lisbon Strategy and its balance between economic growth, 
employment and social policy dimensions, while the 2005 Spring European Council 
(European Council, 2005) repeatedly made reference to social cohesion as part of the 
Lisbon process and, in particular, rearticulated the commitment of the EU and 
Member States to social inclusion policy. More broadly, and in the wake of the 
rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in the referendums on France and the 
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way of reconnecting the integration process to the concerns of EU citizens. Thus, the 
European Parliament (European Parliament, 2006) suggested a need to respect the 
initial Lisbon balance between economic and social dimensions and to retain (but 
democratise) social OMC processes as a means of articulating the values associated 
with the European Social Model. The Germany Presidency of the EU in the first half 
of 2007 also reiterated the need to make social Europe more visible; for Lisbon to 
combine competitiveness and social cohesion; and for the EU to pursue a European 
Social Model as a model of values (German Government, 2007). And in a statement 
made by the social ministries of eight Member States,
1 the necessity of reinforcing the 
European Social Model, of relaunching social Europe, and of viewing social policies 
as also promoting economic growth and competitiveness within the context of Lisbon 
was repeated . So it would seem that issues of social policy and social governance are 
to be reintegrated into the Lisbon agenda. 
Three remarks might be made on the trajectory of Lisbon to date. The first is 
that while the European Commission has often been viewed as the ally of the NGO 
sector in promoting the idea of a social Europe, it has been Member States that have 
proven to be stronger proponents of a social dimension to Lisbon: perhaps the fate of 
the Constitutional Treaty is responsible for their attempts to show Europe with a more 
social face. But in any event, the shifting identity of the Lisbon strategy is indicative 
of contestation over leadership within Lisbon: is it to be driven by the European 
Commission as in previous European projects or is it determined by Presidencies of 
the Council, groups of like-minded states or looser, but fluctuating coalitions? The 
second remark is that arguably, it has been no bad thing that the social co-ordination 
                                                 
1 ‘Un nouvel élan pour l’Europe sociale’ Declaration of 7 February 2007: 
http://www.rpfrance.eu/article.php3?id_article=665 
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process. After all, amid the metaphor of the Lisbon triangle it is easy to forget that all 
sides of the triangle were never completely equal, with the economic side dominating. 
The lesson of the absorption of the employment process into the Lisbon II integrated 
process might be that proximity to Lisbon tends to result in the economic policy 
framework swamping any social dimension. The third remark is that perhaps the more 
important issue is not whether Lisbon does or does not have a social dimension but 
rather to bring clarity to what Lisbon is for and what sort of social dimension it ought 
to have. Because, there is a danger that the Lisbonization of EU policies has resulted 
in Lisbon representing the entirety of EU economic, social and environmental 
governance rather than as a more particular, strategic policy framework. 
Notwithstanding the desire to focus Lisbon II on ‘growth and jobs’, paradoxically, the 
Lisbon agenda appears to have become even more open-ended with policies as 
diverse as space policy, energy policy and the internal market all linked to the 
achievement of Lisbon goals. In this way, the debate about Lisbon’s social dimension 
tends to then be conflated with debates about how to secure and advance EU social 
policy in general. Arguably, it will not be enough to reintegrate social governance 
within the Lisbon process without also sorting out more clearly which aspects of 
social policy ought to be pursued through EU institutions in the first place, and 
secondly, which policies ought to be developed inside or outside the context of Lisbon 
(a theme that is central to the conclusions of this paper). 
 
What Social Commitments? 
As Daly has cogently noted, attempts at interpreting the existence, content, strength 
and originality of the social commitments originally made at Lisbon are fraught with 
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time. Certainly, the Conclusions to the Lisbon Summit placed ‘social cohesion’ on the 
Lisbon agenda and committed the EU and Member States to making ‘a decisive 
impact on the eradication of poverty’. However, we can detect three different 
organising frameworks within which the social cohesion/inclusion objective might be 
taken forward: 
•  Employment policy – inasmuch as inclusion is to be achieved by inclusion in 
the labour market and signified by possession of a job, then the aim of social 
inclusion in largely an outcome not of a distinctive inclusion policy but as a 
consequence of the pursuit of employment policy; 
•  Modernising Social Protection Systems – this framework has a dual 
orientation: it suggests the need for a distinctive approach to the reform of 
social protection systems as a support to employment policy to facilitate 
activation; but it also refers to ensuring the adequacy and long-term 
sustainability of social welfare systems for those economically inactive; 
•  Mainstreaming Policies – an approach that inquires into the multidimensional 
phenomenon of exclusion and seeks reform across a range of policies.  
Depending on the organising framework, the specificity and scope of a distinctive 
policy approach to social exclusion varies. In the Lisbon Conclusions, and in the 
papers presented to the European Council from the European Commission, the 
Presidency and the Council, all three frameworks appear to be in play, creating 
ambiguity as to the distinctiveness of any approach to social inclusion and as to its 
potential breadth. Over time the relationship between these organising frameworks 
and their relationship to the Lisbon process has evolved. 
  8  With the launch of Lisbon II and the emphasis on social progress as the 
product of growth and jobs, it was easy to sideline the inclusion strategy by 
emphasising the importance of the first framework: first and foremost, inclusion 
would be achieved through tackling joblessness. However, with the rehabiliation of 
Lisbon’s social dimension the issue of what sort of distinctive policy framework to 
pursue has come back onto the agenda. 
The emergence of a streamlined Social Protection and Social Inclusion OMC 
process – launched after Lisbon II (and discussed further below) – points firmly in 
favour of the ‘modernisation’ framework as motivating the future social dimension of 
Lisbon. After all, in hindsight one could look back at Lisbon as simply launching the 
first in a series of processes intended to take forward the agenda that had been set by 
the Commission prior to Lisbon in its Communications on modernising social 
protection (European Commission, 1997; 1999). There, the Commission had 
identified four priority areas: (1) to make work pay and provide secure income; (2) to 
make pensions safe and make pensions systems sustainable; (3) to promote social 
inclusion; and, (4) to ensure high quality and sustainable health care. The streamlined 
process has the potential to be more directly integrated into the Lisbon process by 
focusing on the modernisation of social protection systems as contributing not only to 
growth and jobs by cutting the costs of public expenditure and promoting activation 
policies but also developing social cohesion by ensuring the adequacy and 
sustainability of those systems: themes that were already present in the policy debates 
surrounding the inception of the Lisbon process. 
The difficulty, perhaps, is how to reconcile a commitment to tackling poverty 
and social exclusion as part of a modernisation framework, with the more 
multidimensional approach that has also been repeated in Lisbon policy documents 
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acknowledgement of the multidimensional phenomenon of social exclusion has 
played an important role in coalescing support for EU action from a range of 
stakeholders, not least the NGO community. However, what may be gained in terms 
of legitimacy may be offset by a lack of clarity as to the priorities for EU co-
ordination in the context of Lisbon; as to what may nonetheless be appropriate for EU 
action outside this context; and as to what may be best left in the hands of the 
Member States.  
More particularly in governance terms, a tension has emerged between 
pursuing social objectives through OMC and the distinctive Community Action 
Programme
2 which is intended to support EU initiatives on social exclusion. This 
Programme is reminiscent of a prior phase of EU intervention in the social sphere in 
the form of the Poverty Programmes which funded projects and supported the 
dissemination of research on thematic issues relating to poverty and social exclusion. 
While the Action Programme was intended to be more directly supportive of the 
OMC process, the relationship between the two has often been unclear. The Action 
Programme has utilised the multidimensionality of social exclusion as its primary 
organising framework. It supports the ‘peer review’ process, but in doing so, it has not 
been obvious how any lessons learned from these reviews ought to feed more directly 
into the OMC process and its priorities. In institutional terms, the Action 
Programme’s priorities are set by its own committee and not by the SPC which is the 
key interface of the OMC processes. 
  In sum, while the streamlined Social Protection and Social Inclusion process 
holds out possibilities for better articulating the social dimension of Lisbon, there 
                                                 
2 EP and Council Decision 50/2002 establishing a Community Action Programme to Combat Social 
Exclusion (2002-6): OJ L 10 (12.1.02), pp. 1-7. 
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a broader multidimensional approach. As will be suggested in the following section, 
this also flows from a failure to clarify what the rationale for co-ordination might be. 
 
Why Co-ordinate? 
The use of a co-ordination technique has allowed deep ambiguities as to the rationale 
and added-value of EU intervention in social policy matters to remain unresolved. For 
those who might resist EU influence on domestic policy it is easy to emphasise the 
loose nature of the co-ordination process. Even for those who would wish for a 
stronger legal basis for EU social policy, investment in the co-ordination processes 
has substituted for that institutionalised commitment and has, at least, kept issues of 
social governance on the political agenda both at EU level and domestically. 
However, I want to suggest that greater clarity is required as to the rationale and 
added value of EU policy co-ordination as a technique of social governance. Indeed, it 
is argued that the use of co-ordination as a technique cannot be a pretext for avoiding 
interrogating why EU level co-ordination is required. While the Lisbon Conclusions 
may have stated that the OMC would be applied ‘in line with the principle of 
subsidiarity’, in practice, the rationale and purposes of co-ordination have tended to 
be latent and implicit with a tendency of the arguments to lapse into polarisation 
between being in favour or against a social dimension to Lisbon, rather than 
articulating and justifying more clearly what might be the justifiable aims of EU-level 
co-ordination in this policy domain.
That said, an opportunity for rendering explicit the rationale and ‘added value’ 
of the social OMC processes was raised in the context of the Commission’s 
evaluation of these process conducted in 2005/6. The responses made by stakeholders 
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rather than an attempt to articulate more clearly what the rationale for co-ordination 
ought to be (and therefore whether the outcomes of the process were consistent with 
expectations). Responses emphasised added value in terms of putting or maintaining 
social issues on the EU and on the national agendas with few direct references to 
ways in which those agendas had then changed. While the process had spurred states 
to put in place strategic frameworks that had not otherwise existed, what was less 
clear was what the function of co-ordination would be thereafter. Emphasis was 
placed by some stakeholders on the development of contacts and exchanges: but 
whatever the desirability of these forms of contact and dialogue, the issue is the extent 
to which they are systematically conducted within the organizational framework of a 
co-ordination process with specific aims and ends, rather than as fluid and ad hoc 
occurrences that could be conducted outside the EU context. 
How then might we conceive of the rationale for co-ordination? It is not 
uncommon to find the rationale for co-ordination depicted as one of seeking 
‘convergence’: indeed Citi and Rhodes seek to map and analyse OMC processes in 
terms of their ‘convergence capacity’ (Citi and Rhodes, 2007). This focus on 
‘convergence’, however, fails to unpack potentially competing rationales for co-
ordination. In an early contribution, Biagi (1998) distinguished between co-ordination 
as ‘convergence’ and co-ordination as ‘co-operation’: the former implying strong 
constraints on domestic autonomy, the latter weak limits on that autonomy. Here, 
three different rationales for co-ordination can be put forward: 
•  Counteracting externalities and spillovers flowing from unilateral policy 
choices of Member States; 
•  Addressing common challenges facing Member States; 
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matching of solutions to identified problems. 
Each rationale has a different engagement with Member States’ policy autonomy: the 
first views that autonomy as potentially dangerous and requires to be policed; the 
second views the exercise of autonomy as inefficient due to the common nature of the 
challenge; the third considers autonomy as capable of managing problems but in ways 
which may be suboptimal. While the first two rationales suggest ‘convergence’ in the 
sense that states should adopt the same or similar policies, the third rationale is more 
agnostic as to what states can or should learn and from whom: it need not imply that 
all states adopt the same policies but rather, in Biagi’s terms, commits them to co-
operate. 
  If one were to apply a subsidiarity test to EU policy co-ordination, it is evident 
that managing externalities or inefficiencies arising from national policy-making 
would justify EU intervention (although as some commentators have suggested, 
addressing externalities and common challenges may be better dealt with by 
instruments other than policy co-ordination – Notre Europe, 2005).  More difficult is 
the justification for EU action as a means of managing heterogeneous problems: while 
states may seek solutions to those problems, it may be to other international forums or 
indeed better domestic sources of information that governments ought to look. The 
‘added value’ of EU action becomes more problematic to determine. Even if some 
form of broader policy co-ordination and lesson-learning might be desirable, there is, 
nonetheless, an issue of whether to use the Lisbon framework as a means of 
prioritising common and pressing problems. 
  More specifically in terms of social governance, while one might argue that 
the social inclusion process deals with potential externalities arising from constraints 
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States (in the context of EMU), more often the problem of social expenditure is 
constructed as a common problem exacerbated by new common challenges arising 
from globalisation and demographic change. This is associated with the idea that new 
poverty and social exclusion risks are emerging. In general, the modernisation of 
social protection framework constructs the rationale for co-ordination within a logic 
and rationale of common problem solving – the common problem of how to reform 
social welfare systems to activate those who can work and to provide adequate and 
sustainable resources for those that cannot. However, the more multidimensional 
framework encourages a more open approach to working through the autonomy of 
states to selectively and electively learn from one another.  
It is suggested that one of the problems of the social co-ordination processes 
has been this tension between a rationale for co-ordination focused on specific 
common challenges (primarily the modernisation of social protection framework) and 
a rationale based on selective and elective policy learning through policy dialogues 
and exchanges (exemplified by the multidimensional approach to social inclusion). 
Whereas the former provides a relatively stronger basis for EU level intervention and 
for a relatively prescriptive type of co-ordination, the latter may require more specific 
justification in terms of why any given dimension of the phenomenon of social 
exclusion requires a response co-ordinated by the EU.  
The lesson from the discussion in this and the previous sections may be that 
whereas co-ordination is better suited to situations where states face evident and 
agreed common challenges and where specific and defined objectives of co-ordination 
can be pursued in parallel to, and supportive of, co-ordination of economic and 
employment policies within the Lisbon framework, a more thematic but looser form 
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explore other dimensions of social exclusion. In short, there is probably a need to split 
off certain elements of the social inclusion agenda and to treat some as inside Lisbon 
to be pursued through some form of policy co-ordination and some as outside and 
better progressed by other means of co-operation. 
 
Reform of the Lisbon Social Governance Architecture 
 
The OMC architecture has always contained within it tensions as to whether different 
elements of the methodology are complementary or rival one another in identifying 
the focus and priority for Member States policies. On the one hand, the National 
Action Plans and the peer review processes have placed the emphasis on Member 
States selecting their own national priorities and targets (recall that no EU targets 
exist in the area). On the other hand, Member States are to be guided by EU-level 
common objectives, indicators and the evaluations of the NAPs contained in the Joint 
Reports. But even as regards these elements, it has not always been evident that the 
objectives, indicators and key messages from the Joint Reports provide a consistent 
set of steers for the Member States. 
The Nice Objectives for social inclusion – underpinning both the first and second 
cycles of biennial National Action Plans on Inclusion – reflected the three organizing 
frameworks of employment policy, modernising social protection systems and a 
multidimensional mainstreaming approach. These objectives were to: 
•  Facilitate participation in employment, and access by all to resources, rights, 
goods and services. 
•  Prevent the risk of exclusion. 
  15•  Help the most vulnerable. 
•  Mobilise all relevant bodies. 
In support of these objectives, a common set of social indicators – the so-called 
‘Laeken indicators’ – were agreed as a reference point for evaluation of the policy 
performance of states (though attempts to actually rank states were resisted by states). 
These indicators – a set of ten primary and eight secondary indicators – had a much 
narrower focus than the broad objectives, focusing principally on low income and 
joblessness. This narrowing of focus was also evident in the selection of the ‘at risk of 
poverty’, ‘long term unemployment rate’ and ‘dispersion of regional employment 
rate’ as the three ‘social cohesion’ indicators in the portfolio of ‘Structural Indicators’ 
used by the Commission to underpin its Spring Report to the European Council. There 
has, then, always been a tension between seeking to use indicators to underpin key 
social messages relating to low income and employment, and their use as a basis for a 
more multidimensional framework for policy learning across states.  
As noted in the previous section, although the Commission undertook a formal 
evaluation of the extant social inclusion and pensions processes in 2005/6 (for a 
synthesis of the responses see, European Commission 2006a), the emergence of a 
reformed Lisbon social governance architecture owed more to a commitment to 
‘streamline’ the social inclusion, pensions and healthcare processes (European 
Commission, 2003) than necessarily to learn lessons from the experience of the 
operation of the processes. A central aim of streamlining was to ensure a process 
through which key social messages would emerge. Has then the revised architecture 
addressed the tensions highlighted here? 
Streamlining entailed a degree of rationalisation in terms of the agreed 
objectives and indicators for the process (European Commission, 2005c). The Council 
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promote: 
•  social cohesion, equality between men and women and equal opportunities 
for all through adequate, accessible, financially sustainable, adaptable and 
efficient social protection systems and social inclusion policies; 
•  effective and mutual interaction between the Lisbon objectives of greater 
economic growth, more and better jobs and greater social cohesion, and 
with the EU's Sustainable Development Strategy;  
•  good governance, transparency and the involvement of stakeholders in the 
design, implementation and monitoring of policy. 
 
Arguably the first of these objectives prioritises the modernisation of social protection 
framework discussed earlier, while the second simply repeats the aspiration for the 
Lisbon process to achieve a better articulation of economic, employment, social and 
environmental policies. The third objective reframes the ‘mobilisation’ Nice objective 
into a somewhat blander principle of good governance. In addition to the overarching 
objectives, there are also revised objectives for each policy strand of the streamlined 
process. As regards social inclusion, the original Lisbon commitment to making a 
decisive impact on the eradication of poverty and social exclusion is reaffirmed, and 
is to be ensured by Member States by: 
•  access for all to the resources, rights and services needed for participation 
in society, preventing and addressing exclusion, and fighting all forms of 
discrimination leading to exclusion; 
•  the active social inclusion of all, both by promoting participation in the 
labour market and by fighting poverty and exclusion; 
•  that social inclusion policies are well-coordinated and involve all levels of 
government and relevant actors, including people experiencing poverty, 
that they are efficient and effective and mainstreamed into all relevant 
public policies, including economic, budgetary, education and training 
policies and structural fund (notably ESF) programmes. 
 
These revised objectives retain many of the elements of the original Nice objectives, 
and therefore, of the multidimensional approach to addressing poverty and social 
exclusion. Whether much turns on the reorganisation of these objectives is less 
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rather than a complete break with the past. The function of the objectives seems to be 
more in the nature of securing commitment to the process from a range of 
stakeholders rather than as a more specific means of steering the process. 
  To accompany the revised objectives, the supporting indicators were also 
altered . Fourteen indicators underpin the overarching objectives. Of those not 
specifically related to health or pensions, these indicators focus principally on issues 
of low income (e.g. the at risk of poverty rate, income inequality, in-work poverty) 
and employment (e.g. jobless households, activity rates, employment of older 
workers), but with a specific indicator on financial sustainability of social protection 
systems (based on public social expenditure projections). For the social inclusion 
strand, the Laeken indicators have been remodelled to focus on eleven primary, three 
secondary and eleven context indicators. They still have a strong focus on low income 
and employment related indicators, but also signal the development of new indicators 
on material deprivation, housing and child well-being. This new portfolio, while 
representing continuity with the past, also reflects some of the key priorities identified 
in the 2005 Commission/Council Joint Report.  This was the first report to anticipate 
streamlining in that instead of providing a comprehensive survey of social inclusion 
across the Member States (utilising the NAPs and data in respect of the indicators), it 
sought in a dozen pages to synthesise some key messages for the Spring European 
Council meeting.  Seven key priorities were identified in the 2005 Joint Report: 
increase labour market participation 
1.  modernise social protection systems 
2.  tackle disadvantages in education and training 
3.  eliminate child poverty 
  184.  ensure decent accommodation 
5.  improve access to quality services, and 
6.  overcome discrimination and increase integration of the disabled, 
ethnic minorities and immigrants. 
While the country-by-country and statistical analysis has not been done away with – it 
now appears as a supporting document – there has been a clear shift away from any  
idea of the Joint Report as a resource for selective and elective policy learning to a 
position whereby it seeks to deliver key common policy messages. 
  Streamlining was intended to provide a means of articulating between 
Lisbon’s social governance architecture and the economic and employment processes, 
not only by bringing the inclusion, pensions and healthcare processes together, but 
also by focusing the social message. However, there remains a fundamental tension 
between reforms aimed at focusing on key common priorities for states, and an 
architecture which remains committed to a multilateral and open process of policy 
learning. For some, multilateral and information-rich policy learning is the very 
driving force of OMC. However, the lessons of the first cycles of the process may be 
that this openness may actually undermine the ability of the Lisbon process to focus 




In its 2000-5 Social Policy Agenda, the Commission committed to launching a 
consultation exercise on the best means to promote the integration of people excluded 
from the labour market. This could have been read as little other than viewing social 
inclusion as coterminous with inclusion in the labour market and therefore reducible 
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2005-10 Social Agenda (European Commission, 2005b) – and notwithstanding the 
less favourable political climate to push for new social measures –  the Commission 
announced its intention to link the consultation on integration of those excluded from 
the labour market with an investigation into the reasons why national ‘minimum 
income’ schemes were not effective enough. The Treaty provisions on the 
consultation of the social partners were to be the means for pursuing this consultation, 
albeit that in practice the consultation involved all relevant stakeholders. The 
Commission launched its consultation process in a Communication in 2006 (European 
Commission, 2006b). In it, the Commission identified three pillars to its concept of 
‘active inclusion’: (1) labour market inclusion by facilitating individuals back into the 
labour market; (2) income support especially for the ‘hard core’ of those most 
excluded from the labour market; and (3) access to services (counselling, healthcare, 
childcare, training etc). And yet at the same time, the challenge of minimum incomes 
schemes would be to achieve these aims without becoming financially unsustainable. 
In this way, the Commission set out a core common problem for the modernisation of 
social protection systems: how to provide accessible, adequate and sustainable 
minimum incomes for those excluded from the labour market while ensuring 
appropriate incentives to work for those that can.  
  Is the OMC, then, an appropriate means of addressing this common problem? 
Certainly for many of the respondents to the consultation, in the absence of clearer 
legislative competence for the EU, the OMC was a potentially effective means of 
taking this issue forward. Earlier initiatives such as the 1992 Council 
Recommendations were considered to have not succeeded in their aims of converging 
domestic social protection systems. However, it seems possible that the Commission 
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Recommendations – focused on minimum income. 
  The fate of this initiative will, I believe, have important implications for the 
design and operation of EU social governance after Lisbon. A number of possibilities 
present themselves. One option would be to use the Social Protection and Social 
Inclusion OMC process as a means of taking forward substantive provisions of a 
Council Recommendation on minimum income. After all, the revised objectives and 
indicators for the social inclusion strand chime rather nicely with this focus. A second 
option would be to seek to integrate this specific priority into a Lisbon III integrated 
processes with a distinctive social cohesion chapter. Given the relationship between 
the social inclusion goals of the initiative and the aims of Lisbon in terms of 
activation and control of public expenditure, this could well be exactly the sort of 
policy issue that would fit within a revised Lisbon process. The third option would be 
for a stand alone Council Recommendation on minimum income. 
  The third option appears the least desirable. The danger here would be that it 
might establish a yet further strand of co-ordination but outside of the Lisbon/OMC 
frameworks. However, selection of either of the other two options returns us to two 
recurring themes of this paper. The first is whether the current OMC process as it 
applies to social inclusion is overly aspirational in seeking to bring together all and 
every dimension of social inclusion as worthy of an EU co-ordination process. As has 
been suggested already a tension exists between the desire for policy prioritisation 
entailing constraint on domestic policy autonomy, and a governance architecture 
which indicates a certain agnosticism as to how Member States exercise that 
autonomy in matching policy solutions to heterogenous problems. A focusing of the 
social inclusion strand of the OMC process towards ‘active inclusion’ – while 
  21normatively strong in terms of utilising the resources of EU institutions towards 
meeting a common challenge – would exacerbate this tension and also the tension 
between an OMC process seeking to accommodate the multiple dimensions of social 
exclusion, and the supporting EU Action Programme (now rolled into the 
PROGRESS programme). The second recurring theme concerns the relationship 
between the Lisbon process and EU social governance. Any attempt to develop a 
social chapter within the Lisbon integrated co-ordination process would then raise the 
question as to the relationship between social policy co-ordination within a revised 
Lisbon co-ordination process and a ‘satellite’ Social Protection and Social Inclusion 
OMC (at least as regards the social inclusion dimension of that process). Integrate too 
much and Lisbon loses its ability to act as a strategic framework (a risk which has 
perhaps already materialised even without a social chapter). Integrate some social 
dimensions relevant to defined Lisbon priorities and one is left to wonder what role is 
left either for the OMC, or for Action Programmes or indeed for any other instrument.  
 
Conclusions: From Governance to Accountable Government 
 
I want to suggest a possible solution to the problem posed in the preceding section. It 
lies in reforming both the Lisbon process and the OMC social processes. As regards 
Lisbon, policy co-ordination must focus both on identifiable common challenges 
based on the need to modernise and activate social protection systems and on 
challenges that represent current priorities. The aims of co-ordination are not open-
ended or indefinite: there is no point to an on-going co-ordination process. Rather, the 
aim would be to persuade states to adapt their systems within a specified time period 
in light of clearly defined EU objectives and in light of the experiences, practices and 
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income would be an appropriate social priority for Lisbon. It would give real meaning 
to making a decisive impact on the eradication of poverty and social exclusion. 
As regards social governance outside of this Lisbon process, the focus should 
shift radically away from any idea that the EU is or ought to be capable of governing 
through OMC as regards the multiple dimensions of social exclusion. Indeed, the 
whole idea of EU ‘governance’ through OMC is perhaps too esoteric when contrasted 
with the competence and responsibility of national governments to provide for the 
welfare of their citizens and residents. Instead of seeking to govern through OMC, the 
emphasis should be on holding government to account.  
First, this means holding the EU and Member States to account for the 
effectiveness of the Lisbon process. This would entail an evaluation of the policy 
performance of the Lisbon strategy both as regards the ability of economic progress to 
produce social progress but also as regards Member States adaptation of their social 
welfare systems in pursuit of specified Lisbon social priorities e.g. on accessibility, 
adequacy and sustainability of social protection systems. This would then help to 
identify what social messages to ‘feed into’ Lisbon in future cycles.  
Secondly, there is also scope for holding the EU and Member States to 
account for their wider policies and strategies that contribute towards or seek to 
combat social exclusion. In some ways this is already what the OMC processes seek 
to achieve at least as regards Member States policies. Nonetheless, the process is 
politically compromised. While the Commission has asserted its right to produce a 
distinct Communication as a draft of the Joint Reports, nonetheless, even this draft is 
subject to prior comment by Member States in the SPC. In any event the Member 
States are then also the joint authors of the Joint Report: hardly conducive to harsh 
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the review of policies was sacrificed through the need to use the reports to deliver key 
messages and in effect to steer future co-ordination efforts. 
Using the model of agencies – and perhaps the role of the Fundamental Rights 
Agency might be relevant and applicable – the task of information gathering and 
evaluation could be allocated to an agency as a means of holding the EU and Member 
States to account. The expertise of this agency would draw on the social scientific 
community – the very scholars who are already represented as consultants and experts 
in projects funded under the Community Action Programme – but could also open out 
to civil society more generally. In this way, instead of viewing the relationship 
between civil society and OMC processes as potentially problematic from a 
democracy point of view (i.e. the debate over representative versus participative 
democracy), civil society is relieved of the burden of seeking to be inside of 
governance and instead would play a vital role in rendering EU institutions and 
Member States to account through their monitoring and evaluation of policies. This 
would shift the emphasis away from OMC as a candidate new governance 
architecture and instead remodel co-ordination in light of other international 
instruments and processes – e.g. the Council of Europe Social Charter – through 
which to hold states (and even the EU itself) to account. Indeed, this would also be a 
way of framing EU social policies within the normative framework of fundamental 
rights which has long been an ambition of European transnational social NGOs. To be 
sure, the issue might be whether such an EU monitoring process is required given the 
presence in particular of the Council of Europe instrument and indeed there is an 
argument for looking beyond the boundaries of the EU in the search for a European 
approach to combating social exclusion. Nonetheless, it might be that scope exists for 
  24an EU mechanism to operate in tandem with the Council of Europe (as already exists 
with other fundamental rights). 
To conclude, the time has come, perhaps, to recognise that the ‘legitimating 
discourse’ of OMC as a ‘mode of (new) governance’ has run its course and look 
instead to harnessing elements of the methodology of co-ordination to the more 
classic ambition to hold government to account. 
  25References 
 
Biagi, M. (1998),  ‘The Implementation of the Amsterdam Treaty with Regard to 
Employment: Co-ordination or Convergence? International Journal of Comparative 
Labour Law and Industrial Relations 14:4, 325-336 
 
Borrás, S. and Jacobsson, K. (2004), ‘The open method of co-ordination and new 
governance patterns in the EU’ Journal of European Public Policy 11:2, 185-208. 
 
Daly, M. ‘EU Social Policy After Lisbon’ Journal of Common Market Studies 44:3, 
461-81. 
 
Council of the EU (2004), 2624
th Council Meeting, Doc. 15140/04. 
 
Citi, M. and Rhodes, M. (2007)  New Modes of Governance in the EU: Common 
Objectives versus National Preferences (EUROGOV) N-07-01, available at 
http://www.connex-network.org/eurogov/pdf/egp-newgov-N-07-01.pdf. 
 
European Commission (1997), Modernising and Improving Social Protection in the 
EU, COM (1997) 102 final. 
 
European Commission (1999), A Concerted Strategy for Modernising Social 
Protection, COM (1999) 347 final. 
 
European Commission (2003), Strengthening the Social Dimension of the Lisbon 
Strategy: Streamlining Open Coordination in the field of Social Protection  COM 
(2003) 261 final. 
 
European Commission (2005a), Working Together for Growth and Jobs: A New Start 
for the Lisbon Strategy. COM (2005) 24 final. 
 
European Commission (2005b), Communication on the Social Agenda, COM (2005) 
33 final. 
 
European Commission (2005c), Working together, working better: A new framework 
for the coordination of social protection and social inclusion policies in the European 
Union COM (2005) 706 final. 
 
European Commission (2006a), Commission Staff Working Document Evaluation of 
the Open Method of Coordination for Social Protection and Social Inclusion, SEC 
(2006) 345. 
 
European Commission (2006b), Concerning a consultation on action at EU level to 
promote the active inclusion of the people furthest from the labour market. COM 
(2006) 44 final. 
 
European Council (2005), Presidency Conclusions, Doc. 7619/05. 
 
European Parliament (2006), Report on a Social Model for the Future A6-0238/06. 
 




High-Level Group (2004), Facing the Challenge: The Lisbon Strategy for Growth and 
Employment (Brussels, 2004). 
 
Notre Europe (2005), ‘The Lisbon strategy and the open method of co-ordination’, 
Policy Paper No. 12, p. 16 
 
SPC (2004), Joint Opinion of the Employment and Social Protection Committee on 
the Report of the High-Level Group, Doc. 15529/04. 
 
 
 
 
  27